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Testing Wisconsin's Alien Land Law:
Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. v. Warren
In 1976 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Wisconsin Alien Land Law in Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. v. Warren.1
The principal question in this case involved the validity of the state's
classification scheme distinguishing the right of resident aliens to
purchase real property from that of non-resident aliens. Concluding
that the classification was not an "unreasonable" one because these two
classes of aliens have substantially different economic and political
interests, the court held that the classification did not violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and that the Alien Land
Law was therefore constitutionally valid.
Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. (LGI) is a Texas corporation whose entire
stock is held by West German citizens. As general partner in Lehndorff
Farms, Inc., a West German limited partnership which held options to
purchase property in the state of Wisconsin, it sought a declaratory
2
judgment as to the validity of section 710.02 of the Wisconsin statutes.
This statute limits the purchase of real property by non-resident aliens
and by corporations twenty percent of whose stock is held by nonresident aliens to no more than 640 acres. Any purchase in excess of that
results in automatic forfeiture to the state. LGI argued that the statute
violated the constitutions of Wisconsin 3 and the United States 4 and
contravened the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN)
5
between the United States and West Germany.
LGI posed three questions regarding the Wisconsin statute: (1) Did it
apply to limited partnerships? (2) How did the treaty with West Germany
affect it? (3) Did it violate the equal protection clause? The Wisconsin
court dispensed with the first question by holding that the statute not
1 74 Wis. 2d 369, 246 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
2 Wis. STAT. § 710.02 (1977).
3 WIs. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
- Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United StatesFederal Republic of Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 [hereinafter cited as FCN
Treaty].
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only limited the right of individuals, corporations and associations to
hold real property, but also limited the right of limited partnerships to
do so as well. The court reasoned that when the Wisconsin legislature
enacted the Alien Land Law in 1887 it clearly intended to restrict the sale
of Wisconsin land to all foreign individuals and companies. As late as
1975 the Wisconsin legislature had reaffirmed that sentiment by refusing
to abolish the law. Though LGI made strong policy arguments citing the
statute's incompatibility with Wisconsin's efforts overseas to encourage
foreign investment within the state, these arguments did not convince
the court to invalidate the legislation.
The U.S. Constitution provided the basis for the Wisconsin court's
holding that the FCN treaty with West Germany did not affect the enforcement of the statute. Under Article VI, any treaty made between the
United States and a foreign governmerzt is the "Supreme Law of
the Land," binding upon all constitutions, laws and courts of the individual states.6 The express terms of the treaty determine whether it
governs the question before the court. Article VII, section 1 of the FCN
treaty provides "national treatment" to foreign nations and companies
"engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other
activity for gain."' 7 Although this clause alone could allow any number of
types of foreign investment, a further reading reveals that the treaty
does place some restrictions on West German buying power in the
United States. Article VII, section 2 grants each party the right to limit
those activities conducted for gain and, more specifically, the right to
limit "exploitation of land or other natural resources." s Article IX deals
even more specifically with the issue at hand by providing aliens with
"national treatment with respect to leasing land, buildings, and other real
property" 9 and with "other rights in real property permitted by the
applicable laws of such other party." 10 Importantly for the present case,
the treaty fails to deal specifically with the sale of real property. This
omission renders state law on the issue controlling.
The regulation of real property conveyance is a matter for state law.
The U.S. Supreme Court has said, "It is an acknowledged principle of
law, that the title and disposition of real property is exclusively subject
to the laws of the country where it is situated." 1 Unless a treaty in some
manner proscribes this power, a state's regulation of its property is
subject to little federal control. The only federal enactments which regulate real property ownership in any manner are the Alien Property

6 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

7 FCN Treaty, art. 7, § 1.
§ 2.
9 Id. art. 9, § 1(a) (emphasis added).
10 Id. § 1(b) (emphasis added).
11 McCormick v. Sullivan, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192, 202 (1825).The Court's use of
country was a reference to the state of Virginia.
8 Id.
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Custodian Regulations 12 and the Foreign Assets Control Regulations. 13
These regulations have only the limited authority to control the property
rights of enemy or hostile aliens. 14
The Wisconsin court cited a treaty with the Netherlands to support
its position on state autonomy in land law. 's Under its provisions, the
Dutch government would not restrict the sale of land to citizens of U.S.
states which similarly do not restrict sales to foreigners; but to citizens of
states which restrict land sales on the basis of alienage, the Dutch government could likewise restrict its sales. 16 The treaty with the Netherlands thus implicitly accepts the fact that each individual state has the
power to regulate the privilege of foreigners to purchase land. By holding that the statute did not contravene the treaty with West Germany,
the Wisconsin court intended to assert and preserve Wisconsin's autonomy in the regulation and sale of real property.
A number of cases not cited by the Wisconsin court support this
strict interpretation of the FCN treaty. In Terrace v. Thompson 17 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that "unless the right to own or lease land is given
by the treaty, no question of conflict [between state law and treaty] can
arise."' 8 Similarly in Frick v. Webb' 9 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
power of the individual states to "forbid indirect as well as direct ownership and control of agricultural land by ineligible aliens" 20 so long as a
treaty did not specifically accord aliens those rights. The FCN treaty
with West Germany fails to grant non-resident aliens the right to purchase property in the United States. Since the treaty therefore does not
conflict with state regulation of land conveyance, it follows that Wisconsin may restrict the sale of its land to aliens in any manner it chooses.
This broad conclusion by the Wisconsin court left LGI's final and
most important argument, the constitutionality of the statute. For over
half a century state legislatures have argued about whether or not a
state law limiting the sale of land to certain persons violates the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In 1953 California led
the vanguard in abolishing these restrictive land laws. Largely relying
on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Shelley v. Kraemer 21 that

128 C.F.R. pts. 501-10 (1977).
13 31 C. F. R. pt. 500 (1976).
14 See Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Estate, 60 MINN. L.
Rav. 621, 629 (1976).
15 74 Wis. 2d at 376, 246 N.W.2d at 821.
16Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 26, 1956, United StatesNetherlands, 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942, art. IX, para. 1, 2.
17 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
18 Id. at 223.

19 263 U.S. 326 (1923).
20 Id. at 334.

21334 U.S. 1 (1947). The U.S. Supreme Court held that covenants restricting the sale of
property based on race or color were unconstitutional.
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restrictions based on race or color were unconstitutional, the California
Supreme Court held in Sei Fujii v. State22 that since its Alien Land Law
primarily restricted the sale of land to Orientals, it was discriminatory on
the basis of race as well as alienage. However, the California decision
can be distinguished on this point from the present case. Since section
710.02 discriminates solely on the basis of alienage and not race, Shelley
v. Kraemer does not determine its constitutionality. In assessing the
validity of its Alien Land Law, the Wisconsin court therefore focused on
the treatment of aliens alone.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Truax v. Raich 23 was the first
to challenge the power of a state to regulate its aliens. In that case an
Arizona statute prohibiting employers from hiring less than eighty percent native Americans forced Raich, an Austrian cook, to leave his place
of employment. The Court struck down the statute and held: "The
assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a
livelihood when lawfully admitted to the state would be tantamount to
the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work."'24 Citing Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 25 the court further contended that the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment were "universal in
their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, or color or of nationality; and the
equal protection of the laws [was] a pledge of the protection of equal
26

laws."

In 1948 two cases further undermined state regulation of alien
rights. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Oyama v. California2 7 that a U.S.
born child could not be statutorily barred from receiving a gift of land
from his ineligible alien parents. In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,28 where California had denied an ineligible alien the issuance of a
fishing license, the Supreme Court held that "the power of a state to
apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class was confined
within narrow limits. "29 California based its restrictive fishing licensing
on federal naturalization classifications and concluded that ineligible
aliens could not fish in California waters. The Supreme Court held this
practice to be a misapplication of the immigration and naturalization
laws, because they were intended largely to allow the deportation of
aliens likely to become "public charges" (paupers, professional beggars,

22 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
23239 U.S. 33 (1915).
24 Id. at 42.
25 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

26 239 U.S. at 39.
27 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
28 334 U.S. 410 (1948).

29 Id. at 420.
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or vagrants). 30 Thus federal naturalization classifications were not automatically appropriate for purposes of state legislation.
If the federal naturalization classifications were improper for state
use, the question remained as to what standard should be used for
purposes of state legislation. In 1944 the Supreme Court stated in
Korematsu v. United States 31 that any classification based on race or color
alone would be "immediately suspect" and subject "to the most rigid
scrutiny." 32 In abolishing the California Alien Land Law Sei Fujii necessarily extended that scrutiny to classifications based on alienage. Thus
the Wisconsin Alien Land Law is also subject to close judicial scrutiny.
The Wisconsin court cited several U.S. Supreme Court cases supporting close judicial scrutiny of classification schemes based on alienage. Graham v. Richardson33 involved Arizona and Pennsylvania statutes
which contained minimum residency requirements for aliens receiving
welfare benefits. The Supreme Court held these provisions unconstitutional for depriving aliens of basic needs similar to those discussed in
Truax. As a class aliens were a "prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
minority" 34 in need of public assistance. The Court reasoned that since
aliens had to serve in the armed forces and pay taxes, both burdens of
U.S. citizenship, they should receive the benefits as well.
In Shapiro v. Thompson 35 the Supreme Court recognized the right of
interstate travel. Prior to Shapiro a question existed as to whether interstate movement was a privilege or a right. If the Court determined it a
privilege, the state would have greater discretion in regulating interstate
movement; if, however, it were a right, the equal protection clause would
be immediately invoked to invalidate any state restriction. Shapiro eliminated the confusion by abolishing this distinction with regard to welfare
benefits. Nonetheless the Court asserted that a state should not attempt
to regulate a right in an effort merely to preserve the "fiscal integrity of
its own programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures.
... But a state may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinc'36
tions between classes of its citizens."
The Supreme Court in Sugarman v. Dougallk7 found that the New
York statute requiring minimum residency for employment with the
civil service violated the equal protection clause. However Justice Rehnquist in his dissent also recognized certain exceptions as instances
when an alien could not invoke this constitutional provision. He noted
eleven instances in which the Constitution clearly distinguishes citizens
30

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(8), 1182(a)(15) (1970).

31 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
32

Id. at 216.

33403 U.S. 365 (1971).
34 Id. at 372.
35 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
36 Id.

at 633.

37 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
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from aliens, including election to public office and the uniform rule of
naturalization. In his opinion these distinctions were not superfluous,
38
but were included for the purposes of national security.
The dissenting opinion in Sugarman laid the groundwork for the
most recent Supreme Court decision cited by the Wisconsin court,
Mathews v. Diaz. 39 In this case a federal medical insurance program
contained a minimum residency requirement similar to those in the
above three cases. The Court held that this requirement did not violate
the equal protection clause. One possible reason that the Supreme Court
distinguished Diaz from the earlier cases was that it involved a federal
rather than state program. Since the federal government has greater
discretion over alien regulation than the states through its naturalization
and immigration laws, it may further exercise this authority in its other
programs as well. The Court suggested a second and more plausible
reason for upholding a statute discriminating within the class of aliens:
In short it is unquestionably reasonable for Congress to make an
alien's eligibility depend on both the character and the duration of
his residence .... But it remains true that some line is essential, that
any line must produce some harsh and apparently arbitrary consequences, and, of greatest importance, that those who qualify
under the test Congress has chosen may reasonably be presumed to
have40a greater affinity with the United States than those who do
not.
Affinity with the United States is thus a substantial factor in upholding statutory discrimination among aliens. Whereas aliens already residing in a state have shown that affinity by their prolonged period of
residency, aliens having just arrived in the state do not. The restrictions
in Graham, Shapiro and Sugarman were held unconstitutional largely
because they served to discourage entry into or continued residency in
the individual states. By denying aliens the right to work, to move and
ultimately to survive in the various states, these restrictions made
fulfillment of a required period of residency almost impossible. The
denial of federal medical insurance benefits in Mathews, however,
would not .have such a detrimental effect. The Court reasoned that
since aliens applying for these benefits would already be settled in one
of the states, limiting federal benefits would not serve to discourage
their continued residency in that state. A minimum period of residency
for aliens for the receipt of federal medical insurance benefits was
therefore constitutional.
Although Shapiro abolished the distinction between a privilege and
a right with respect to welfare benefits, the Mathews affinity requirement
for federal programs is similar to the "special public interest doctrine,"
38 Id.

39 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
40
Id. at 82-83.
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which created the distinction between privilege and right for state
purposes. In 1915 Justice Cardozo said:
To disqualify aliens is discrimination indeed, but not arbitrary discrimination, for the principle of exclusion is the restriction of the
resources of the state to the advancement and profit of the members
of the state. Ungenerous and unwise such discrimination may be.
It is not for that reason unlawful.... The state in determining
what use shall be made of its own moneys, may legitimately consult
the welfare of its own citizens rather than that of aliens. Whatever
is a privilege rather than a right, may be made dependent upon
citizenship. 41
Arguably resident aliens who have the required affinity under Mathews
impliedly also contribute to the advancement and profit of the state's
citizenry. The "special public interest doctrine" espoused by Justice
Cardozo therefore continues to enjoy some validity. Under this doctrine
the test for constitutionality is one of reasonableness.
So long as the discrimination within a statutory classification
scheme is not arbitrary, a state may restrict not only the granting of
privileges but by extension the granting of rights as well. The Wisconsin
court adopted this view by citing several of its own cases supporting
statutory classification schemes. State v. Morgan, 42 a 1966 case involving
alleged discrimination against persons under the age -of sixty-five, concluded that the tax break afforded the elderly was a clear example of a
statutory classification based on a "regard for the public good" and
worthy of "substantially different legislative treatment." In State v.
Ewald43 the Wisconsin court held that if the classification was a "natural
and reasonable one" it did not violate the equal protection guarantee.
Finally in Simanco, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 44 again involving
tax breaks, the court recognized "that the equal protection clause, unless
apparent misclassifications [were] gross indeed, [was] of little moment
in determining the constitutionality of a state tax."' 45 So long as the
classification is "neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some
reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there was no denial of
46
the equal protection of the law."
In the present case the state argued that absentee ownership was
potentially detrimental to the welfare of the community. The Wisconsin
court agreed that "limiting the benefits of land ownership to those who
share in the responsibilities and interests of residency [was] not an

People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427 (Ct. App. 1915).
30 Wis. 2d 1, 139 N.W.2d 585 (1966).
43 63 Wis. 2d 165, 216 N.W.2d 213 (1974). In this case the alleged discrimination was
against the male sex in the statutory definition of rape.
44 57 Wis. 2d 47, 203 N.W.2d 648 (1973).
45 Id. at 55, 203 N.W.2d at 652.
46 Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1909).
41

42

58

N.C.J.

INT'L

L. & COM. REG.

unreasonable exercise of legislative choice." ' 47 Basing its decision
primarily on economic considerations, the court concluded that the
statutory discrimination between resident and non-resident aliens was
constitutional. Whereas a resident alien contributes to the advancement
and profit of the community, a non-resident alien does not.
The foregoing analysis by the Wisconsin court has a firm foundation
in federal case law and yet fails to answer directly the crucial issue raised
by the case. Citing the 1975 vote of the Wisconsin legislature not to
repeal the Alien Land Law, the court broadly asserted that such discrimination is reasonable but never treated the issue of why absentee
ownership should be considered detrimental to the community. This
omission is a substantial error by the court since a blanket assumption of
reasonableness fails to uncover possible prejudices which might make
the law unconstitutional. In Sei Fujii, the California court abolished,
because of such underlying prejudices, its Alien Land Law. 48 Upon
reviewing the grounds for enacting the law the California court
determined in that case that racial prejudice had played the major role.
Had the Wisconsin court gone further to discover the ground for the
law's enactment, it might have found that considerations other than
sound economic policy had motivated the legislature. In this sense the
Wisconsin court's decision leaves the "reasonableness" of the statutory
discrimination against non-resident aliens in doubt.
-

47 74 Wis. 2d at 388, 246 N.W.2d at 825.
48

Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
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